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Mitigating the impact of the economic crisis will 
require using all tools necessary to regain a sustainable 
path to growth. This includes measures to support 
trade expansion, including in developing countries, 
such as those in Africa. This paper provides context for 
understanding why trade facilitation and lowering trade 
costs matter to Africa both today and over the long term. 
Trade costs are higher in Africa than in other regions. 
Using gravity-model estimates, the authors compute ad-
valorem equivalents of improvements in trade indicators 
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for a sample of African countries. The evidence suggests 
that the gains for African exporters from cutting trade 
costs half-way to the level of Mauritius has a greater effect 
on trade flows than a substantive cut in tariff barriers. As 
an example, improving logistics so that Ethiopia cuts its 
costs of trading a standardized container of goods half-
way to the level in Mauritius would be roughly equivalent 
to a 7.6 percent cut in tariffs faced by Ethiopian exporters 
across all importers. 
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1.  Introduction: African Trade Today and Challenges in Perspective 
 
Until the financial crisis of 2008, world trade and investment flows had risen annually 
over the past several decades.  The trade performance of Sub-Saharan African countries, 
however, has been disappointing. Africa’s share of world exports has dropped by nearly 
two-thirds in the past three decades: from 2.9 percent in 1976 to 0.9 percent in 2006
2. 
This implies that if Africa’s share of world exports had remained constant since the mid-
1970s, its export revenue would be approximately 10 times larger than its current value.  
 
The high cost of trade—i.e., the cost of transporting goods and moving them across 
borders—are a major obstacle to African trade performance. A growing literature has 
gathered empirical evidence of the negative impact of trade costs on a country’s trade 
performance. High trade costs have a negative effect on country economic performance 
in several ways.  For example, a country with relatively high trade costs confronts lower 
consumer welfare through higher prices of imported goods. Domestic producers are less 
competitive because inputs sourced outside the country are relatively more expensive.  
Direct evidence on border costs shows that tariff barriers are relatively low across all 
countries.   Weak infrastructure and institutions, however, contribute to high trade costs 
along the logistics chain in Sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, data and evidence 
suggest that African countries have some of the highest trade costs in the world. 
 
Many of the slowest-growing economies in Africa are either engaged in conflict or have 
recently emerged from conflict. Geography has also played a major role in shaping the 
economic fortunes of African countries.  Fifteen of them are landlocked
3 and about 40 
percent of Africans live in these countries, which are dependent on the political stability, 
infrastructure, and institutional quality of their neighboring transit countries to reach 
overseas markets.  A country’s remoteness from major world markets, especially the 
landlocked countries in Africa, tends to drive trade costs higher than would be the case in 
other developing countries. 
 
All these conditions—combined with corruption, underdeveloped institutions, constraints 
on business competition, and weak governance—make international trade and investment 
in Africa costly. Reducing traditional trade barriers on African exports, such as tariffs, 
remain important and must continue to be at the center of multilateral negotiations.  We 
argue, however, that Africa will not be able to benefit from continued lowering of tariffs 
and other trade barriers unless action is taken to lower trade costs in the region.  
Moreover, as empirical research has demonstrated, growth in exports can be a powerful 
engine for poverty alleviation.  For example, farmers that are able to grow high-yield 
export crops are, on average, less poor than those that engage in subsistence farming. 
High trade costs prevent the full realization of gains from trade and can diminish the 
poverty reduction effect of export opportunities for African countries.  
                                                 
2 Figures computed from COMTRADE data available through the World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS). 
3 The landlocked African countries are: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   3
 
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we review recent literature and indicators on 
trade costs relevant to Africa. We classify trade costs into four broad groups: border-
related costs, transport costs, costs related to behind-the-border barriers, and the costs of 
compliance with rules of origin that are specific to preferential trade. Our review does not 
intend to be comprehensive. We primarily focus on recent research presenting evidence 
of the impact of trade costs on African countries and highlight new data addressing the 
sources of trade costs.  The paper presents the limited evidence on direct costs related to 
trade transactions.
4  We also present data on indirect measures of trade costs, which are 
primarily inferred from case studies and empirical work in gravity models. Indeed, the 
lack of official statistics on trade costs in many countries around the world is a major 
limitation for empirical research.
5  It is important to note when considering these data that 
trade costs and facilitation can be either primarily tied to trade friction, such as resources 
necessary in getting a product to the final user, or costs associated with government 
regulation, which can be addressed through policy reform.  
 
Second, building on data and gravity model estimates by Hoekman and Nicita (2008), we 
estimate ad-valorem equivalents of a counterfactual improvement in trade-cost indicators 
for several African countries. As data on African countries is generally sparse, the 
advantage of Hoekman and Nicita’s specification is the incorporation of trade cost 
variables with good coverage of African countries. This includes new data in the 
Logistics Performance Index (LPI) (World Bank, 2007). and trade indicators constructed 
by Doing Business (World Bank, 2008). Moreover, the model includes the ad-valorem 
trade restrictiveness indices estimated by Kee, Olarreaga, and Nicita (2008). These 
provide a theoretically sound way of summarizing—in a single figure—the 
restrictiveness of tariff and non-tariff barriers which can be disparate across tariff lines.  
 
Drawing on gravity estimates, we provide an illustrative assessment of the relative 
importance of trade costs captured by these estimators and proceed in three steps. First, 
we build on Hoekman and Nicita’s proposed gravity model to obtain gravity estimates 
and analyze the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to the inclusion of different 
indicators as well as to the use of several estimation techniques. Second, using gravity 
estimates, we compute the “ad-valorem” tariff cut that would be equivalent to reducing 
the trade costs associated with moving a standardized container (as defined and reported 
by Doing Business) halfway to the value of Mauritius, the top performer in Africa. 
Finally, we compare these illustrative ad-valorem equivalents across African countries. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition of trade costs and 
discusses some orders of magnitude. In Section 3, we review recent research on four 
dimensions of trade costs: border-related costs, transport costs, costs related to behind-
the-border issues, and the costs of compliance with rules of origin that are specific to 
preferential trade. In Section 4, we use gravity estimates to compute illustrative ad-
                                                 
4 For instance, an early study by Yeats (1990a) documents the poor quality of UN statistics on African 
trade. 
5 Only the United States and New Zealand officially publish shipping and transport cost data based on 
declarations from the importers for fiscal purposes.   4
valorem equivalents of improvements in some trade cost-related dimensions for African 
countries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Definition of Trade Costs and Orders of Magnitude 
 
Trade costs can be broadly defined to encompass all costs incurred in getting a final good 
to a final user—other than the cost of producing the good itself. In general, an exporter or 
importer incurs trade costs at all stages of the export or import process. This often starts 
with obtaining information about market conditions in a foreign market and ends with 
receipt of final payment for a good. Frequently, firms serving the local market and 
willing to sell their product overseas are subject to costs of compliance with standards 
and technical regulations imposed by the importing country. As these costs would not be 
incurred if the goods were sold exclusively on the domestic market, they can be 
considered a trade cost. A similar framework applies to preferential trade agreements 
because preferential access to partners’ markets requires compliance with rules of origin. 
These rules may involve, for example, adjustments to the intermediates mix or production 
process that often involve additional costs for producers.  
 
In an extensive review of the literature on the sources of trade costs, Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2004) estimate that trade costs for industrialized countries, on average, are 
equal to an ad-valorem equivalent of 170 percent. The authors break down this estimate 
into three components: a 21 percent ad-valorem equivalent for transportation costs, 44 
percent for border-related trade barriers, and 55 percent for retail and wholesale 
distribution costs, as shown in Figure 1.
6  It appears that trade costs have different 
magnitudes and patterns. This is true across countries and regions, as well as across 
sectors and goods. Available data suggest that for developed countries, the costs of 
trading a good, including both international trade costs and domestic distribution costs, 
can be even larger than the costs of production. 
 
The ratio of trade costs to production costs appears to be larger for developing countries 
than for developed ones. This is true especially in Africa where producers face 
considerably higher transport costs than developed countries face. As outlined in Figure 
1, Anderson and Van Wincoop’s estimates can be considered as an illustrative 
benchmark for similar trade cost figures that can be estimated for African countries. 
                                                 
6 The cost components are expressed in ad-valorem equivalent terms: 1.7=1.21*1.44*1.551. The first two 
components account for total international trade costs that are about 74 percent (=0.74=1.21*1.441).    5
Figure 1 























Note: The breakdown of costs is expressed in ad-valorem equivalent terms: 
1.7=1.21*1.44*1.551. 
Source: Estimates are drawn from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004).  
 
To illustrate the variability of trading costs across regional groups, Figure 2 shows the 
average costs of export and import procedures by group of countries presented in the 
World Bank’s (2008) Doing Business report.
7 Among the developing countries in the 
data set, those in Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest costs on average. The costs of 
import and export procedures in Africa are about twice as high as those in high-income 
OECD countries.   
                                                 
7 To ensure comparability across countries, these figures represent the official fees levied on a dry-cargo, 
20-foot, full container load expressed in U.S. dollars and associated with completing the procedures to 
export or import the goods. Costs include the costs of documents, administrative fees for customs clearance 
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Figure 2 









































Source: Doing Business (2008). 
 
 
3. Trade Costs and Their Impact: A Review 
 
A classification of the different types and sources of trade costs can be performed in 
several ways. In this review, we group trade costs in four categories, starting with border-
related costs.  These include both tariffs and non-tariff measures. The restrictiveness 
indices developed by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) provide a summary of both types 
of measures, allowing comparison across countries. Second, we review the evidence and 
the literature on transport costs.  Next, we focus on trade costs related to behind-the-
border issues.  These include topics such as governance, transparency, and the business 
environment.  Fourth, we provide a summary discussion of the costs of compliance with 
rules of origin found in preferential trade agreements. This is an issue central to trade and 
Africa.  In the concluding section, we discuss the contrast between “hard” infrastructure 
(highways, railroads, ports, etc.) and “soft” infrastructure (standards, administrative 
procedures, transparency, etc.).  
 
3.1. Border-Related Costs 
 
Trade Policy and Border Barriers 
 
As goods enter a country, they are subject to a variety of trade policy barriers that 
increase the costs of trading. Traditional trade policy barriers include tariffs (ad-valorem 
and specific), quotas, and a combination of both (tariff-rate quotas, TRQ). Other less 
“traditional” trade policy instruments include anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties,   7
and safeguard measures.  Trade policy barriers increase the costs of exported goods 
abroad and the costs of importing goods. Ng and Yeats (1996) argue that the drastic 
decline in African exports has been related to closed trade regimes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Indeed, the authors suggest that high African tariffs on broad groups of 
production equipment and other goods (often key inputs in agricultural or manufacturing 
activity) represent additional direct costs for African producers.  
 
Because trade policy can take different forms, it is difficult to find a single measure 
condensing trade policy restrictiveness. Although the impact of trade policy measures can 
be estimated as an ad-valorem equivalent for a single good, it can be useful to aggregate a 
large number of tariffs and other trade policy measures into a single figure that 
summarizes the overall level of restrictiveness in each country.  
 
Kee, Olarreaga, and Nicita (2008) develop theoretically grounded indices based on 
research by Anderson and Neary (1994) of trade restrictiveness across countries. The 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and the Tariff Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(TTRI) provide summary measures of trade policies affecting a country’s imports and 
allow comparison across 104 countries (counting the European Union as a single 
country).  Both indices provide a measure of the equivalent uniform ad-valorem tariff, 
which, if applied by an importing country to its imports, would result in a level of 
aggregate imports equivalent to that prevailing under current policy settings. The OTRI 
captures all policies on which information is reported by international organizations 
collecting this data (International Trade Center (ITC), United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These 
comprise ad valorem tariffs, specific duties, and non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as 
price control measures, quantitative restrictions, monopolistic measures, and technical 
regulations.  
 
In contrast, the TTRI is narrower in scope.  This index considers only ad-valorem and 
specific tariffs. Because many NTMs are not necessarily protectionist in intent, the OTRI 
reflects net overall restrictiveness.  It is not a measure of the level of protection that a 
government seeks to provide domestic industry. Some NTMs comprise border 
restrictions, such as quotas or bans, and are motivated by protectionist objectives. Other 
regulatory policies, such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards, are aimed at 
safeguarding human, animal, or plant health. Unfortunately, the measures do not allow 
distinction between objectives. Thus, protection is arguably better measured by the TTRI, 
even if this index is most suited to producing lower-bound estimates of the extent of 
protection in a market.  Both measures can be aggregated at the sector level.  
 
There are two other indicators available on trade restrictiveness—the Market Access 
OTRI (MA-OTRI) and the Market Access TTRI (MA-TTRI). These are estimates of the 
uniform tariff, which, if imposed by all trading partners on exports of a given country, 
would leave the country’s exports at their current level. The MA-TTRI measures 
restrictiveness associated with tariffs alone. The MA-OTRI can be calculated bilaterally 
in order to obtain the level of trade restrictiveness that a given importer country imposes 
on the exports of another exporter (see Kee et al., forthcoming, for details). 
   8
There are three important points to note with respect to restrictiveness indices and trade 
policy patterns. First, it may be misleading to focus only on tariffs as measures of 
restrictiveness.  Non-tariff barriers clearly contribute to the overall restrictiveness of trade 
policy.  For East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the non-tariff component (measured by the difference between OTRI and 
TTRI) is more important than the tariff component (measured by TTRI), as seen in Table 
1a. The same applies to the United States, the European Union, and Japan—three of the 
four largest world traders (see Table 1a).   
 
Second, most of the restrictive trade policies in the data are concentrated on agricultural 
products of particular importance for African countries. The value of the OTRI for 
agricultural products is about twice the OTRI for manufactured goods, as outlined in 
Tables 1a and 1b. Among the four major traders, Japan and the European Union are the 
markets with the most restrictive overall trade policies for agriculture. The European 
Union is the market with the highest restrictiveness tied to NTMs (about 90 percent of 
overall restrictiveness).  
 
Third, the effect of trade policies on exporters’ market access differs across partners and 
regions.  This is due to both the discriminatory use of trade policy measures (i.e., 
preferential trade arrangements) and to the composition of trade. Table 1b reports the 
MA-OTRI and MA-TTRI for exporters in each region and income group. Countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa benefit from both relatively liberal market access, as a result of 
preferential market access to many countries, and low tariffs on commodities that African 
countries export. Among other regions, Eastern European and Central Asian market 
access to high-income countries is facilitated by preferences offered by the European 
Union.  The low TTRI confronting the Middle East and North African exporters is 
largely due to the composition of exports—oil products are generally subject to low 
import tariffs.    9
Table 1a  
OTRI and TTRI (percent), by Region and for the Four Largest Traders, 2006 
 
 
Region  All trade  Agriculture  Manufacturing 
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Note: TTRI is in italics; OTRI is in boldface font. 
Source: Global Monitoring Report (2008), World Bank. 
 
   10
Table 1b 
MA-OTRI and MA-TTRI by Income Group, 2006 
 










































































































































Note: MA-TTRI is in italics; MA-OTRI is in boldface font. 




In a broad context, national customs administrations are in charge of implementing a 
country’s trade policy at the border. This involves, for example, levying tariff duties, 
verifying conformity of imported goods with regulatory requirements, and preventing the 
importation of prohibited or unsafe imports (e.g., illegal weapons or out-of-date 
medicines).  
 
Delays in customs clearance raise trade costs.  This involves opportunity costs for firms 
that are slower to market and may lose contracts with importers, as well as higher storage 
fees at the port of entry, for example. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2008) find that each 
day of delay at customs is equivalent to a country distancing itself from its trading 
partners by an additional 85 km.  Keeping customs procedures as simple and transparent 
as possible contributes to reducing the time needed to clear customs. 
   11
Figure 3 
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Source: Doing Business. 
 
The World Bank (2008) Doing Business dataset reports procedural requirements for 
exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods by ocean transport. Figure 3 
shows the average number of export and import procedures across regions. South Asia 
has the highest number of export and import procedures, closely followed by Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Product Standards and Technical Regulations 
 
Product standards and technical regulations can have a dual impact on trade costs.  
Meeting product standards can involve additional variable or fixed costs on exporters that 
need to alter production processes to adapt products to regulations in the importing 
country. Moreover, product certification necessary to demonstrate compliance with 
standards can involve additional costs for the exporters in multiple markets. However, 
product standards and technical regulations in the importing country can reduce 
exporter’s information costs if they convey valuable information as to consumer tastes or 
industry needs in the importing country. In the absence of standards, such information 
would be costly for the exporting firm to collect. Accordingly, standardization in sectors 
where information costs are important could help reduce trade costs and promote trade.  
 
The net impact of product standards on trade depends on the relative magnitude of the 
effects. The empirical evidence on these issues is limited, primarily due to the   12
impediment of collecting reliable data
8 and constructing comprehensive indicators on 
standards in different sectors across countries. Among the papers that have found 
evidence as to the negative effects of standards on trade from African countries, Otsuki et 
al. (2001) examine the impact of European aflatoxin standards on African groundnut 
exports. They find that a 10 percent increase in restrictiveness is associated with a fall in 
trade volume of about 11 percent.  Disdier et al. (2007) use data on WTO notifications of 
mandatory sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, as well as technical regulations, to 
measure the impact of standards across a large number of sectors. They generally find 
that standards are associated with negative trade impacts, in particular for exports from 
developing countries to OECD countries.  
 
On the positive net impact of standards on trade, Moenius (2004) observes that country-
specific standards tend to promote trade in the manufacturing sector. However, the 
opposite result holds for homogeneous goods, such as agricultural products. Such an 
outcome could be consistent with the interpretation that higher information costs in 
manufactures can be surmounted by standards. 
 
One way to reduce the costs associated with standards is through international 
harmonization of standards.  This can limit the need for exporters to alter products to 
meet multiple standards for different markets. Czubala, Shepherd, and Wilson (2007) 
examine the impact of EU standards on African textiles and clothing exports. By 
identifying standards aligned with ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 
standards (as a proxy for de facto international norms), the authors find evidence that 
non-harmonized standards reduce African exports.  In contrast, they find that EU 
standards harmonized to ISO standards are less trade restricting.  Their results suggest 
that efforts to promote African exports of manufactures may need to be complemented by 
measures to reduce the cost of product standards through new efforts to support 
international harmonization of standards. The authors suggest that steps to harmonize 
national standards with international norms, including through the World Trade 
Organization’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, promise concrete benefits for 
African exporters.  
 
                                                 
8 Although it is difficult to directly observe the possible trade benefits of standards, we do know something 
more about their direct cost impacts. The World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade database (Wilson and 
Otsuki, 2004) provides some informative data. In Sub-Saharan Africa, firms invest on average 7.65 percent 
of sales in order to comply with foreign standards. These data also show, however, that experiences differ 
greatly from one firm to another: the range of investment costs reported by firms runs from 0.01 percent of 
annual sales to 124 percent. Part of this apparent variation is due to the metric used: for constant costs, 
larger companies with higher levels of sales will tend to report lower costs as a percentage of sales. It also 
suggests that firms may have some leeway in terms of how they react commercially to changes in foreign 
standards.      13
3.2. Transport Costs 
 
Transport costs also matter to trade.  Each kilometer a good travels requires fuel, labor, 
and capital expense.  Does distance to markets matter as much today as it did decades 
ago?  Discussion on this matter continues and empirical work has addressed this question.  
For example, Hummels (1999) estimates the elasticity of shipping and costs with respect 
to distance, and charts its evolution over time for air and ocean shipping over the period 
1974-98.  He finds that the difference between costs associated with shipping comparable 
ocean/shipped commodities over a long (9000 km) route and a short (1000 km) route 
decreased by 27 percentage points from 1974 to 1998.  The effect of distance on costs 
appears to decline over time.  Over the years, technological improvements, such as the 
introduction of containerization in maritime transport in the 1950s, appear to have 
contributed to the reduction in transport costs. 
 
Despite the contribution of technical improvements to lowering trade costs, shipping 
costs from African countries to major world markets can be considerably higher 
compared with other regions.  Figures 4a and 4b show shipping costs from several cities 
to two of the largest European ports, Rotterdam and Algeciras, reported by Maersk, a 
major shipping company. To ensure comparability among figures, we collected the 
freight costs for a standard 40-foot container transporting textiles. Despite the distance 
between both European ports, freight costs from each city in the sample to Algeciras and 
Rotterdam are similar. Consider Santos and Dakar, the closest South American and 
African cities in the sample to Algeciras. Despite the fact that distance to Santos is about 
twice the distance to Dakar, the cost of ocean freight is lower from the Brazilian city. 
Moreover, the presumably low-value of exports from developing countries, especially in 
Africa, inflates the transport costs of a container when expressed in ad-valorem terms. 
 
Indeed, maritime transport exhibits important economies of scale. Larger trade flows are 
conducive to scale economies in shipping.  To further illustrate the relationship of freight 
costs for large versus small exporters, Hummels (2006) considers the case of Japan and 
Côte d’Ivoire.  These countries are equidistant to the west and east coasts of the United 
States, respectively. Shipping costs from Côte d’Ivoire are twice as high as shipping costs 
from Japan. This is true even after adjusting for differences in the commodity 
composition of trade. In addition, Hummels and Skiba (2004) use data from importer-
exporter pairs to estimate that doubling trade quantities leads to a 12 percent reduction in 
shipping costs. Arvis et al. (2007) illustrate the tendency of shipping lines to set higher 
tariffs in smaller ports with less traffic, describing the case of exporters of fruits and 
vegetables from south Mauritania. They argue that because of maritime transport price 
differentials, exports are processed in the Dakar port, in Senegal, rather than in 
Nouakchott, despite the border crossing costs and longer distance to market for these 
products.   14
 
     Figure  4a  and  4b 
Transport Costs from Selected Cities to a European Port 
Transport costs from selected cities to Rotterdam (standard container, 
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Source:  Maersk. Transport costs corresponding to July 2008, see: 
http://www.maersk.com/en/Pages/Welcome.aspx 
 
Recent research also identifies poor infrastructure as a significant barrier to trade 
expansion (e.g., Limao and Venables, 2000). Buys, Deichmann, and Wheeler (2006) 
investigate the potential trade benefits of investing in upgrading and maintaining a trans-
African highway network. The proposed network links 83 major cities at a length of 
about 100,000 km, and the estimated benefits are found to be significant. Buys, 
Deichmann, and Wheeler find that intra-African trade, as a whole, can be expected to 
increase from 10 billion to about 30 billion U.S. dollars per year, while initial 
investments and annual maintenance costs would be relatively moderate over the course 
of the investment cycle.  For instance, an upgrade of the road from Bangui in the Central   15
African Republic to Kisangani in Congo DR is expected to increase the volume of trade 
by 7.93 percent. 
 
Figure 5 









Source:  Graph constructed with data from Doing Business (2008). 
 
Landlocked countries in Africa are particularly at a disadvantage. To access overseas 
markets, landlocked countries rely on the physical infrastructure and logistic capacity of 
transit countries.  They are also subject to costs related to the administrative practices and 
political stability in transit countries. As for African landlocked countries, dependence on 
a transit country implies higher transaction costs. Figure 5 shows the costs associated 
with completing export procedures as reported by Doing Business in 2008 for several 
African countries. The fees include costs for documents, administrative charges for 
customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges, and inland transport 
costs. Not surprisingly, export costs are ranked among the highest for most landlocked 
countries.  
 
Limao and Venables (2000) estimate that the median landlocked country’s transport costs 
are 46 percent higher than the equivalent costs in a median coastal economy.  They also 
find that distance explains only 10 percent of the change in the transport costs. Poor road 
infrastructure represents 40 percent of the transport costs predicted for coastal countries 
and 60 percent for landlocked countries, which is especially relevant for African   16




International transport in Sub-Saharan Africa also suffers from low competition, 
reflecting the regulations of African governments intended to promote national shipping 
companies and airlines. For example, as described by Collier and Gunning (1999), many 
African governments (especially in West Africa) have adopted “cargo reservation 
schemes,” which allow privileged liner operators to set inflated freight rates.   
 
Studying primary international corridors in Africa,
10 Teravaninthorn and Raballand 
(2008) argue that the costs backed by transport-service providers are not excessively high 
in Africa. Nevertheless, the transport prices charged to end-users in Africa are relatively 
high compared with prices in developed countries and most developing countries. This 
finding is notable given the low level of wages for truckers in Africa compared with 
wages elsewhere, as illustrated in Table 2.   
Table 2 
Median Monthly Wages for Truckers  
(U.S. dollars) 
 
Country  Median monthly wages 
France  3,129 
Germany  3,937 
Chad  189 
Kenya  269 
Zambia  160 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
 
Teravaninthorn and Raballand suggest that the trucking market structure and environment 
in West and Central Africa are characterized by strict market regulation leading to low 
transport quality.  By contrast, in East Africa, the trucking environment is more 
competitive and the market is more mature. Trucking operators from landlocked 
countries, especially in West and Central Africa, have benefited from formal and 
informal protection for decades. The result is higher transport prices and lower quality of 
services. Trucking surveys also find the presence of a large mark-up and profit margin for 
transport providers.  This is due, in part, to regulation leading to high transport prices 
along international corridors, such as those in West and Central Africa.  By contrast, 
Teravaninthorn and Raballand also find that major corridors in Southern Africa are the 
                                                 
9 Faze, McArthur, Sachs, and Snow (2004) present a detailed appendix with regional overviews outlining 
key challenges facing the landlocked countries in each region of Africa. 
10 The study focuses on four corridors covering Africa’s four sub-regions and including 13 countries. These 
corridors carry more than 70 percent of the international trade of the selected landlocked countries.  The 13 
countries served by the corridors are: 
West Africa:     Ghana, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo 
Central Africa:     Cameroon, Chad, CAR 
East Africa:       Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda 
Southern Africa:     South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia   17
most advanced of all corridors included in their study in terms of prices and efficiency of 
services; this is mainly because of an unregulated transport market.  
 
Figure 6 compares transport prices with the Logistics Perception Index (LPI)
 11  for some 
countries as well as African regions. Compared with other countries, such as France and 
the United States, transport prices in Africa are more expensive and provide a lower 
quality of service, as measured by the LPI.  The Central African region is an extreme case 
of high prices associated with low quality. 
 
Figure 6 



































































Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
 
Building on Wilson et al.’s (2003) methodology, Njinkeu, Wilson, and Powo-Fosso 
(2008) analyze the impact of reform along four categories of trade facilitation efforts: 
port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment, and services 
infrastructure. Using a gravity model, they find that the port and service infrastructures 




                                                 
11  The LPI is a measure of perceptions of the logistics environment of 140 countries along seven areas:  i) 
efficiency of the clearance process by customs and other border agencies,  ii) quality of transport and 
information technology infrastructure for logistics, iii) ease and affordability of arranging international 
shipments, iv)  competence of the local logistics industry, v) ability to track and trace international 
shipments, vi) domestic logistics costs, and vii) timeliness of shipments in reaching destination.  It allows 
comparison across countries and regions. It is based on a yearly survey of international freight forwarders. 
The survey uses an anonymous, Web-based questionnaire that asks professionals in several logistics service 
companies worldwide to evaluate their country of residence, as well as eight countries they are dealing 
with, on seven logistics dimensions. Country performance in these areas was evaluated using a 5-point 
scale (1 for the lowest score, 5 for the highest). The LPI is a weighted average of these measures 
constructed using principal component analysis in order to improve the confidence intervals.     18
3.3. Behind-the-Border Issues and Other Sources of Costs  
Corruption, Governance, Transparency, and the Business Environment 
Recent research has focused on the channels through which institutions impact trade. 
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) find that weak institutions act as significant barriers to 
international trade. Trade transactions are inherently risky due to, for example, imperfect 
contract enforceability that goes along with weak institutional regimes. The authors use 
World Economic Forum data to construct an index of the strength of institutions that 
support trade, focusing on contract enforcement and the existence of impartial and 
transparent government policies.  
 
Weak institutions are evident in widespread corruption at various points in the supply 
chain. The empirical evidence supports the view that trade costs are an important 
determinant of extortion and evasion behaviors. Gatti (2004) uses data on corruption and 
trade policy to show that higher trade costs—in this case, tariff rates—are indeed 
associated with a higher level of corruption. Focusing on the evasion mechanism, Fisman 
and Wei (2004) measure the difference between declared export and import values in 
bilateral trade between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland. They find that higher tariff 
rates are associated with larger differences in declared values, which is highly suggestive 
of an important evasion effect. 
 
A recent working paper by Dutt and Traca (2007) provides preliminary evidence on the 
importance of extortion and evasion in regard to the impact on bilateral trade flows. 
Using a gravity model, they show that the trade inhibiting effect of corruption depends on 
the level of trade costs. The authors show that the extortion effect dominates when tariffs 
are low, but becomes less important as they increase. Moreover, the data also appear to 
support the proposition that the trade impeding effects of tariffs are lower in more corrupt 
countries. This finding is consistent with the existence of an evasion mechanism.  As 
tariff rates increase, firms in corrupt countries can limit their impact by making side 
payments to customs officials. 
 
Francois and Manchin (2007) measure institutional quality through the lens of economic 
freedom, focusing on aspects such as the size of government, freedom of trade, the 
protection of property rights, and business regulation. They find that strong institutions 
are associated with increased trade at both the intensive and extensive margins. 
 
Helble, Shepherd, and Wilson (2007) conduct empirical investigations of the role of 
transparency in trade, focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. They use a combination of 
“objective” and perception-based indicators to produce composite measures of importer 
and exporter transparency. Their measures cover two fundamental dimensions of 
transparency: predictability and simplification. To capture the former, they consider data 
such as administrative favoritism, dispersion of tariff rates, extent of tariff bindings, and 
uncertainty surrounding import times. Simplification of a country’s trade regime is 
analyzed using variables including the time taken to import, the number of agencies an 
importer must deal with, the extent of trade barriers other than published tariffs, and the 
prevalence of trade-related corruption. Transparency, particularly as it relates to the 
import regime, can be a significant factor in promoting bilateral trade.  Helble et al. 
(2007) find that improving import transparency in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation   19
(APEC) member economies to the regional average could have a larger impact than 
reducing tariffs or non-tariff barriers to the same level.  The gains from reform accrue 
primarily to the reformers themselves.  The authors suggest that making trade policy 
more predictable reduces uncertainty, and therefore costs, for businesses. The reform 
measures outlined by the authors to raise the transparency of trade policy include: (i) 
binding tariff rates through the WTO; (ii) moving toward “flatter” tariff structures; (iii) 
making import and export delays less variable; (iv) lowering uncertainty surrounding 
unofficial payments; and (v) reducing favoritism in administrative decision making. 
 
Using data from the World Bank’s investment climate surveys, Balchin and Edwards 
(2008) examine the relationship between the business climate, manufacturing 
productivity, and export performance in eight African countries: Egypt, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia.  Based on 
principal components analysis, they construct several indices summarizing different 
aspects of the business climate, and find that indices representing micro-level supply 
constraints, macroeconomic conditions, and the legal environment are all significant 
determinants of the probability of exporting. At the country level, the quality of the 
business climate is found to matter most for export participation in Mauritius and 
Zambia. The study also finds that individual firm characteristics—such as size, age, 
ownership, use of information technology and managerial education levels—are 
important determinants of the decision to enter foreign markets. Indeed, larger and 
younger firms are more likely to export, as well as firms with a larger share of foreign-
owned firms. Moreover, a higher propensity to export is found for firms whose top 
manager has some form of tertiary education and for those having access to the Internet. 
 
Information and Communication Costs 
 
Border costs associated with information barriers are important. Recent empirical work 
reflects this fact in assigning importance to modern information and communications 
technologies as determinants of international trade costs. Limao and Venables (2000), for 
instance, include a measure of telecommunications development (the number of 
mainlines) in their indices of infrastructure quality. Francois and Manchin (2007) take a 
broader approach, including data on mobile telephone usage. Consistent with the view 
that communications costs are an important component of trade costs, both papers find an 
overall positive impact of infrastructure quality, including communications infrastructure 
quality, on bilateral trade. 
 
In line with these arguments, expanded use of the Internet appears to lower the costs of 
trading internationally. It is now much easier—and cheaper—to obtain information on 
foreign market conditions, product standards, and consumer preferences through the 
Internet. This should lower the costs of entering foreign markets and promote trade at the 
margin. Freund and Weinhold (2004) provide the first empirical evidence in support of 
this theory. They find that a 10 percent increase in the number of a country’s Web hosts 
is associated with an export gain of around 0.2 percent. Although this effect is 
statistically significant, it is relatively small in economic terms. Moreover, they find that 
development of the Internet does not seem to have brought about significant changes in 
the impact of distance on trade. This outcome may be consistent with a scenario in which 
the Internet significantly reduces the fixed costs of market entry, such as obtaining   20
information on product requirements or preferences, but does not significantly alter the 
variable costs of international trade reflected in distance to markets. 
 
Other Sources of Costs 
 
Other non-market institutions, such as exporters’ clubs, can have an impact on trade 
costs. For instance, Negri and Porto (2008) assess the benefits of Burley tobacco clubs in 
Malawi.  Tobacco clubs are formed by about 10 to 30 farmers that grow tobacco 
collectively and are designed to promote smallholder tobacco production. One of the 
major services provided by these clubs is access to selling floors in Malawi. In addition, 
club members jointly acquire inputs under group lending (that is, under a common loan 
that is repaid at the time of sales in the auction floors) and work together to monitor debt 
repayment and input use (preventing side selling of fertilizer, for instance).  They also act 
collectively to purchase inputs collectively, often at lower prices. 
 
Moreover, tobacco clubs contribute to economies of scale, particularly in transportation 
services to the selling floors. Finally, the clubs are instrumental in the development of 
supporting networks by encouraging the interchange of farming advice and the provision 
of labor assistance.  Negri and Porto find that club members are much more productive 
than non-members. The tobacco club premium in yield (per acre) ranges from 40 to 74 
percent. Members also earn between 45 and 89 percent more (per acre) than non-
members via sales. This implies income gains from Burley membership of between 20 
and 37 percent. The authors affirm that these gains would be equivalent to increases in 
tobacco prices, for instance due to improved market access abroad, lower transportation 
costs, or better infrastructure, of between 37 and 54 percent. 
 
In another paper exploring the role of export costs in poverty reduction in rural Africa,  
Balat, Brambilla, and Porto (2008) claim that the marketing costs incurred when the 
commercialization of export crops requires intermediaries can lead to lower participation 
in export cropping and, thus, to higher poverty.  The study uses data from the Uganda 
National Household Survey and highlights three major results: (i) farmers living in 
villages with fewer outlets for sales of agricultural exports are likely to be poorer than 
farmers residing in market-endowed villages; (ii) market availability leads to increased 
household participation in export cropping (coffee, tea, cotton, fruits); and (iii) 
households engaged in export cropping are less likely to be poor than subsistence-based 
households.  The authors examine the role of complementary factors that provide market 
access and reduce marketing costs as key building blocks in the link between the gains 
from export opportunities and the poor. 
 
Another source of trade costs relates to the lack of competitive markets in smaller 
countries.  For example, Yeats (1990b) analyzes unit values of iron and steel African 
imports. He finds that 20 former French colonies in Africa paid a price premium of 20-30 
percent, on average, over other importers for iron and steel imported from France over 
the period 1962-87.  Losses associated with these prices totaled approximately 2 billion 
dollars by 1987.  Yeats also finds that similar price premia (20-30 percent) were paid by 
former Belgian, British, and Portuguese colonies in Africa for imports of these products 
from the former colonists. 
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3.4. Costs Related to Preferential Trade: Rules of Origin 
 
A high percentage of African exports to developed countries are shipped on a preferential 
basis. In order to benefit from enhanced market access through a lower preferential tariff, 
producers must comply with rules of origin. The primary purpose of rules of origin in 
such preferential agreements is to prevent trade deflection. This may occur if a 
beneficiary country -- with most favored nation tariff status lower than the one set by the 
country offering the preferences -- imports a product and re-exports it at a profit. 
Nevertheless, well-organized interest groups in any of the partner countries can influence 
the application of these rules to raise costs and restrict trade beyond what is necessary to 
prevent trade deflection. Cadot, de Melo, and Portugal-Perez (2007) apply revealed-
preference arguments to estimate upper and lower bounds of compliance costs of rules of 
origin. The authors obtain trade-weighted ad valorem estimates of compliance costs of 
4.7- 8.2 percent for PANEURO preferences, which include Sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
 
The textile sector is important for Africa and the sector is eligible for trade preferences in 
the United States and the European Union.  The textiles industry employs a large number 
of low-skilled laborers. Many low-income African countries benefit from preferential 
market access for their apparel to the United States and the European Union.  The extent 
of preferential access for apparel to the U.S. market provided by the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) is similar to that provided under the European Union’s 
preferential regimes.  These agreements differ, however, in their application of rules of 
origin.  The European Union, under the Everything But Arms initiative and the Cotonou 
agreement, requires yarn to be woven into fabric and then made up into apparel in the 
same country or in a country qualifying for cumulation.  The AGOA grants a “Special 
Rule” (SR) to “lesser developed countries,” allowing them the use of fabric from any 
origin to still meet the criteria for preferences.  
 
Figure 7 shows a substantial increase in the value of apparel exports with AGOA’s entry 
into force in 2000. Unlike AGOA’s special regime (SR), neither Cotonou nor Everything 
But Arms appeared to have offered a preference mix (tariff preferences and rules of 
origin) conducive to export growth. Comparing African apparel exports with the 
European Union and the United States provides an opportunity to analyze the effects of 
rules of origin on the uptake of trade preferences. By taking advantage of this natural 
experiment, de Melo and Portugal-Perez (2008) find econometric evidence that relaxing 
rules of origin by allowing the use of fabric from any origin increased exports of apparel 
by about 300 percent for the top seven beneficiaries of AGOA’s SR, while also 
broadening the varieties of apparel exported by these countries. 
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Figure 7 























Note:  The 22 Sub-Saharan African countries benefiting from AGOA-SR by 2004 as well as ACP are: 
Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia.   
**The top 7 exporters are: Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, and Swaziland.     
Source: Portugal-Perez (2008) 
 
 
Strict rules of origin have been justified as a means to support more processing in 
developing countries by encouraging integrated production within a country, or within 
groups of countries through cumulation schemes. However, rules of origin can have a 
negative effect as they discourage developing country exports at the intensive margin, as 
well as at the extensive margin through product diversification. In sum, development-
friendly policies would benefit from relaxing the stringency of rules of origin 
requirements. 
 
Recent research provides evidence that the current system of trade preferences granted by 
developed countries to African countries is undermined by the current rules of origin. 
(See Cadot and de Melo, 2007, for an extensive review.) Rules of origin have a legitimate 
justification in preventing trade deflection.  Evidence indicates, however, that they have 
largely been captured by protectionist interest groups and hinder the integration of 
preference-receiving developing countries in the world economy.  A first step in any 
reform agenda should focus on simplification of rules to reduce compliance costs.  For 
example, the different combinations of rules of origin that exist for a single good in 
preferential agreements could be abandoned for single value content.  The World Trade 
Organization could play a role in facilitating the harmonization of rules of origin across 
preferential trade agreements.  
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3.5. “Soft” vs. “Hard” Infrastructure 
 
Trade facilitation measures can be thought of along two dimensions: “hard” 
infrastructure (highways, railroads, ports, etc.) and “soft” infrastructure (transparency, 
customs efficiency, institutional reforms, etc.). A particular interest of this distinction 
centers on comparing the benefits and costs of investment or policy reform along both 
dimensions. Francois and Manchin (2007) provide evidence on the benefits of reform in 
these two dimensions. They estimate a gravity model of international trade that includes 
two aggregate indices of institutional performance, and two indices of infrastructure 
quality. Their results suggest that both hard and soft infrastructure matter for trade 
performance—indeed, they appear to explain more of the observed variation in North-
South trade flows than do tariffs. For low-income exporting countries, the authors find 
that in terms of upgrading hard infrastructure, transport is the most important area. 
However, as income increases, communications infrastructure becomes more important. 
For low-income countries, openness and protection of property rights are relatively more 
important than for higher-income countries.  Moreover, the negative impact of 
government and regulatory interventions in an economy is more strongly felt in high-
income countries than in low-income ones. 
 
Large investments in hard infrastructure projects to improve infrastructure quality alone 
do not necessarily lead to lower transport prices.  Complementary steps in regulatory 
reform are also important. The lack of competition along the different segments in the 
trade logistics chain, for example, can result in high markups favoring cartels among 
logistic service firms. Interest group lobbying and corruption can lead to regulatory 
barriers (such as market access restrictions, technical regulations, and customs 
regulations). Regulation in transport services can protect inefficient logistics operators 
and discourage the entry of more modern logistics operators with lower operational costs. 
Reform to dismantle cartels and enhance competition along different segments of the 
logistics chain is crucial to lower trade costs. In a more competitive environment, 
measures to improve physical infrastructure are likely to yield more significant results. 
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4.  Using Gravity Estimates to Compare Domestic Trade Cost Indicators  
 
This section provides an illustrative assessment of the relative importance of trade costs 
using gravity model estimates. The gravity model predicts that the volume of trade 
between two countries is proportional to their income and inversely related to the 
distance between them. In addition to these core variables, gravity equations can contain 
other variables influencing trade, including institutional characteristics or trade policy 
variables. Estimates from gravity models have been used in a wide variety of applications 
due to the ease with which one can infer the impact of a change in an explanatory 
variable on trade flows. Indeed, much of the research reviewed in the previous section 
centers on exploring the impact of trade costs in a gravity context. One difficulty in the 
research on Africa in regard to trade costs is the limited data available for the region. 
 
Table 3  
Trade-Cost Indicators 
 
Indicators Units  Source  Coverage 
OTRI and TTRI  Ad-valorem 
equivalent 
Kee et al. (2008) 




including 22 SSA 
countries 
Number of days to 




including 47 SSA 
countries 
Costs associated with 
export/import 
procedures 














Aggregate index  








Among data surveyed in the previous section, however, three sets of indicators have 
reasonably good coverage in Africa. These include the trade restrictiveness indices (TRI) 
estimated by Kee et al. (2008), the trading-across-the-border indicators reported by Doing 
Business, and the Logistics Performance Index (LPI). Table 3 describes their main 
attributes. 
 
In order to make the Doing Business trading-across-the-border indicators (time, number 
of documents, and costs of import and export procedures) comparable across countries, 
several assumptions are made about the shipped products and the container that contains 
them. Indeed, products considered in the data are not hazardous, do not require 
refrigeration, and do not require any special phytosanitary or environmental safety 
certification.  In addition, the products are shipped by ocean in a dry cargo, full container 
load of 20 feet. The costs do not include unofficial payments such as bribes that may be 
involved with trading goods. Although shipping some products involves conditions that   25
increase trading costs—such as refrigeration or observance of phytosanitary measures—
the Doing Business figures on export and import costs can be thought of as lower-bound 
estimates. These indicators provide information on the distribution of procedural 
requirements for export and import across countries. Even if the Doing Business 
indicators measure the costs of export and import procedures of a standardized container, 
it is difficult to know the average value of merchandise that a country exports and 
imports in the container, in order to express the costs as a percentage of the value of 
traded products.  Another database is relevant in assessing trade costs in Africa.  Based 
on a worldwide survey of express carriers and freight forwarders, the LPI provides a 
snapshot of the logistic-chain performance in the surveyed countries, including those in 
Africa. The data set covers logistic attributes closely related to “soft infrastructure” (e.g., 
efficiency of customs clearance, competence of local logistics industry, etc.). 
  
To provide orders of magnitude of the relative importance of trade costs in the context of 
Africa, we build on Hoekman and Nicita’s (2008) database that incorporates Doing 
Business, LPI, and OTRI indicators to estimate a gravity model.  After checking the 
robustness of estimated coefficients to the inclusion of different variables and to the use 
of several estimation methods, we employ the estimated coefficients to compute ad-
valorem equivalents of diminishing the costs associated with trading a standardized 
container of goods, as measured by Doing Business, for the African countries in the 
sample (i.e., the equivalent change in ad-valorem tariff restrictiveness that leaves exports 
unchanged following a change in trade costs). Our counterfactual estimates offer insight 
into the effect of policy intervention to lower costs in the absence of more detailed 




Several studies have provided theoretical foundations for the gravity model and 
contributed to its popularity.  These studies show that estimates can be derived from 
different theoretical frameworks, such as the Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, and increasing 
returns to scale models.
12 Theoretical foundations for estimating gravity equations were 
also enhanced in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004). More recently, Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) (henceforth HMR) develop an international trade model 
with firm heterogeneity.  We use the HMR framework as our starting point for the 
empirical work. The model incorporates firms with varying productivity so that only the 
more productive ones find it profitable to export. In addition, profitability of exports 
varies by destination, as exports are higher to countries with higher demand and lower 
variable and fixed export costs. According to the model, the distribution of firms in 
country i exporting to country j is bound by a marginal firm that just breaks even when 
exporting to j, whereas more productive firms make positive profits when exporting to j.  
 
The model has several appealing characteristics that make it appropriate to explain some 
empirical patterns of trade flows.  First, the model can generate asymmetric trade flows 
between two countries.  Second, it can yield zero trade flows between some country pairs 
in either one or both directions. Third, the model yields a generalized gravity equation 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Helpman and Krugman (1985), Deardorff (1998), and Eaton and Kortum (2002).      26
that accounts for the self-selection of firms into export markets and their impact on trade 
volumes.  Finally, no information on the distribution of firms in a given country is 
required to carry out estimates.  
 
HMR use their analytical framework to develop a two-stage estimation procedure that 
generalizes the empirical gravity equation by taking into account the extensive margin 
(the decision to export from country i to country j), and the intensive margin (the volume 
of exports from i to j, conditional on exporting). The first stage consists of a probit 
regression that explains the probability that country i exports to country j (selection 
equation), where the dependent variable is a dummy that is equal to one if country i 
exports to country j. The second stage consists of a gravity equation estimated in 
logarithmic form that explains the volume of exports from i to j (outcome equation) and 
incorporates a term based on estimates of the first-stage, known as the inverse Mills-ratio, 
to correct for the non-random prevalence of zero trade flows and intra-sector firm 
heterogeneity. 
 
The two-stage procedure aims at correcting for two potential drawbacks prevalent in the 
estimation of gravity models. First, a standard selection bias can result from the necessity 
to drop observations with zero trade. Second, there is a potential bias due to unobserved 
firm level heterogeneity resulting from an omitted variable that measures the impact of 
the number of exporting firms, an aspect related to the extensive margin in the model. We 
follow HMR and implement a two-stage procedure to estimate our proposed gravity 
specification. 
 
Gravity Model Estimates 
 
We estimate a gravity model that includes the above-mentioned trade cost indicators 
using data from Hoekman and Nicita (2008). The data set covers 104 importers and 115 
exporters, including 22 African countries. Trade data correspond to 2006. Only for the 
few cases where 2006 data were not available, 2005 or 2004 data were used. Using Doing 
Business data on the regulations to start a business, we updated the entry costs indicator 
for fixed entry costs constructed by HMR to enlarge the coverage of the countries in the 
sample. This binomial indicator uses the sum of the relative costs for a pair of trading 
countries to identify high-fixed cost country pairs, in which the sum of costs is above the 
median for both countries. By construction, this variable reflects regulation costs that 
should not depend on a firm’s volume of exports to a given country, and satisfies the 
exclusion restrictions by being included in the first stage selection equation and excluded 
from the outcome equation in the second stage.
13 
                                                 
13 In order to check the robustness of their findings, HMR also use a variable reflecting common religion 
among partners that provides the exclusion restriction used to help in the identification of the two-stage 
estimators.   27
Table 4.  Gravity Estimates   (2-stage HMR procedure) 
    1a  1b  2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
   outcome  selection  outcome selection outcome selection outcome selection 
Distance (log)  -1.121  -0.439 -1.126  -0.435 -1.091 -0.417 -1.129 -0.434
   [0.024]***  [0.062]***  [0.024]*** [0.062]*** [0.024]*** [0.061]*** [0.024]*** [0.063]***
GDP Importer (log)  0.883  0.253 0.895 0.247 1.002 0.323 0.856 0.219
   [0.027]***  [0.049]***  [0.027]*** [0.049]*** [0.015]*** [0.030]*** [0.028]*** [0.046]***
GDP Exporter (log)  0.816  0.228 0.819 0.226 1.214 0.391 0.825 0.221
   [0.029]***  [0.046]***  [0.029]*** [0.046]*** [0.013]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.047]***
Population Importer (log)  0.122  0.034 0.124 0.028 0.053 0.012 0.146 0.076
    [0.023]*** [0.037]  [0.023]*** [0.037] [0.019]***  [0.034] [0.025]*** [0.039]* 
Population Exporter (log)  0.261  0.016 0.26 0.017 0.011  -0.03  0.25 0.033
    [0.024]*** [0.037]  [0.024]*** [0.037] [0.016] [0.033] [0.026]***  [0.040] 
Landlocked Importer  -0.049  0.104 -0.069 0.119 0.018 0.144  -0.035 0.169
    [0.056] [0.091]  [0.056] [0.091] [0.055] [0.086]*  [0.058] [0.099]* 
Landlocked Exporter  -0.202  -0.093 -0.201 -0.092 -0.013  0.018 -0.157 -0.007
    [0.057]*** [0.091]  [0.057]*** [0.091] [0.056] [0.083] [0.062]**  [0.107] 
Common border  1.256  0.376 1.248  0.369 1.251 0.431 1.234 0.472
    [0.142]*** [0.448]  [0.141]*** [0.456] [0.142]***  [0.468] [0.142]***  [0.429] 
Common language  1.319  0.865 1.317 0.869 1.284 0.861 1.319 0.913
   [0.074]***  [0.250]***  [0.074]*** [0.249]*** [0.072]*** [0.251]*** [0.074]*** [0.257]***
TTRI  -1.319  -0.302       -1.314  -0.34  -1.373  -0.337
   [0.368]***  [0.148]**        [0.356]*** [0.145]**  [0.378]*** [0.149]** 
NTB-RI  0.993  -0.932       0.698 -1.106  0.917 -0.986
   [0.312]***  [0.411]**        [0.312]** [0.384]***  [0.309]*** [0.417]** 
OTRI        -0.692  -0.404            
         [0.185]***  [0.161]**             
LPI Importer  0.367  0.298 0.332  0.326       0.379  0.267
    [0.071]*** [0.145]**  [0.071]*** [0.144]**        [0.075]***  [0.142]* 
LPI Exporter  1.177  0.882 1.173  0.881       1.219  0.823
    [0.073]*** [0.158]***  [0.074]*** [0.158]***       [0.074]***  [0.158]***
DB Import Costs (log)  -0.271  -0.213 -0.291 -0.204 -0.383 -0.277  -0.22 -0.124
   [0.050]***  [0.091]**  [0.050]*** [0.090]**  [0.046]*** [0.083]*** [0.052]*** [0.095] 
DB Export Costs (log)  -0.367  -0.207 -0.364 -0.207 -0.646  -0.38 -0.332 -0.145
 [0.051]***  [0.090]**  [0.051]*** [0.090]**  [0.047]*** [0.079]*** [0.052]*** [0.103] 
Entry costs indicator.     -0.198    -0.209    -0.183     -0.187
      [0.086]**     [0.085]**     [0.085]**     [0.087]** 
# documents to export                    0.064  0.017
                     [0.015]***  [0.018] 
Days to export                    -0.006  -0.007
                     [0.003]**  [0.003]* 
# documents to import                    0.036  0.001
                     [0.013]***  [0.021] 
 Days to import                    -0.01  -0.01
                     [0.002]***  [0.003]***
Constant -29.803  -6.253 -29.878  -6.178 -30.44 -6.243 -30.58 -6.842
   [0.697]***  [1.331]***  [0.698]*** [1.327]*** [0.698]*** [1.345]*** [0.705]*** [1.370]***
Observations  10508  10508 10508 10508 10725 10725 10508 10508 
Note: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets.   28
All regressions are estimated using the PPML estimation method.   
 
 
Table 4 reports estimates of the selection and outcome equation using this two-stage 
procedure for a series of specifications aiming at checking the robustness of the 
estimates. Nearly all the estimated coefficients in the outcome equations for the 
specifications in Table 4 are statistically significant and have the signs expected in 
gravity models. As confirmed by the estimates, trade volumes are positively related to 
partners’ GDP as well as population, and negatively related to distance. Landlocked 
partners trade less.  In the case of landlocked importers, however, the dummy coefficient 
is not significant. Countries sharing a border and a language also tend to trade more.   
 
Columns 1a and 1b report estimates of the outcome and selection equation for our 
baseline specification that includes LPI and Doing Business trading costs for importers 
and exporters. TTRI and NTB-RI are expressed in levels rather than in logarithms—a 
convenient choice to compute “ad-valorem equivalents.” Some variables are not 
significant in the selection equation but remain significant to explain the volume of trade, 
such as population, the landlocked dummy, and the border dummy.  The coefficient of 
the entry-costs indicator is significant and negative in the selection equation, as a pair of 
countries with high entry costs for exporters is less likely to trade. 
 
Clearly, the higher the trading costs of exporting and importing as measured by Doing 
Business indicators, the lower the propensity to trade and the lower the volume of traded 
goods. Similarly, the positive and significant LPI coefficients for exporters and importers 
corroborate the favorable impact of a country’s logistics environment on trade. As to 
trade restrictiveness indicators, the coefficient of TTRI is negative in the outcome and 
selection equations, whereas the NTB-RI seems to have a positive impact on the 
propensity to export but a negative impact on the volume of exports. The mixed signs of 
the NTB-RI coefficients may be due to two reasons. First, the NTB-RI is positively 
correlated with the TTRI and the coefficient of the latter may be capturing some effect of 
the former in the outcome equation. Second, the NTB-RI is a less reliable measure of 
protection than the TTRI, as the raw data used to construct the NTB-RI is less reliable 
than the tariff data used to construct the TTRI. 
 
In specification 2, TTRI and NTB-RI are replaced by OTRI, the sum of the two figures. 
The OTRI coefficient is negative and significant in both equations, which confirms the 
negative impact of restrictiveness on trade.
14  When LPI data are excluded in 
specification 3, the Doing Business export and import cost coefficients become larger in 
absolute value. Finally, specification 4 incorporates the other Doing Business variables 
related to trade costs: the time and the number of documents required to export and 
import. Among their estimated coefficients, only the coefficients of the time to import 
and export are both significant and with the expected signs. However, trading cost 
coefficients become non-significant in the selection equation. These variations are likely 
due to the high correlation among the included Doing Business indicators.   
                                                 
14 As the OTRI coefficient is lower in absolute value than the TTRI coefficient in the first specification, we 
are inclined to employ TTRI estimates in the first specification to compute ad-valorem equivalents of 
diminishing trading costs since this choice leads to more conservative estimates.   29
 
We also check the robustness of estimates to the choice of alternative econometric 
methods. Table 5 reports estimates using alternative methods and reproduces in column 1 
the first specification of Table 4, which is our baseline estimate. Column 2 reports OLS 
estimates when a logarithmic transformation is applied to exports (ln(X)) in order to 
ensure comparability of coefficients.
15 However, the use of logarithms brings in a 
truncation problem in the dependent variable, leaving out observations with zero-trade 
values. To address this issue, a standard solution in the literature consists of shifting all 
export values by one dollar before applying the logarithmic transformation in the 
dependent variable of the equation (i.e., ln(1+X)), which increases the mean of exports by 
one unit, but does not affect its variance.  In addition, observations with zero-trade values 
are linked to zero-values in the dependent variable. OLS estimates with this correction in 
the dependent variable are reported in column 3.  Nevertheless, using OLS under these 
circumstances may lead to biased results if the number of zero-value observations in the 
dependent variable is large. Tobit estimation, reported in column 4, appropriately 
accounts for the censorship of the dependent variable. Nonetheless, as noted by de Melo 
and Portugal-Perez (2008), coefficient estimates can be very sensitive to this (arbitrary) 
choice of adding one dollar in the presence of a large number of zero-trade value 
observations. Indeed, if instead of one dollar a different amount is added to exports 
before the logarithmic transformation to avoid truncation (say, one cent, or ten cents, or 
ten dollars), all coefficient estimates may vary significantly. Eaton and Tamura (ET 
1994) propose to estimate a variation of the Tobit model in which the independent 
variable is the log of exports added by a parameter “a” that is endogenously estimated.
16 
Column 5 reports estimates of this ET-Tobit model. Since our sample does not contain a 
large proportion of observations with zero-trade values, coefficients estimated with these 
techniques do not vary greatly, as seen in Table 5.  
 
Finally, column 5 reports results of the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to deal with 
heteroskedastic errors in log-linear gravity models.
17 The magnitude of coefficient 
estimates varies the most when using this technique, although nearly all signs remain as 
expected. In particular, coefficient estimates for TTRI and Doing Business are greater. A 
possible explanation is that the dependent variable to carry out PPML estimation is in 
levels rather than in logarithmic form, which gives more weight to extreme observations.  
                                                 
15 As explained by  Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the dependent variable is in levels and not in 
logarithmic form when estimating the gravity equation with PPML. 
16 The Tobit maximum likelihood (ML) function is modified to endogenize the choice of the amount (“a”) 
to be added to exports before applying the log in the dependent variable,  which means that the dependent 
variable will be censored at the value ln(a) (see the appendix in de Melo and Portugal-Perez, 2008, for 
details on the Eaton-Tamura Tobit model). 
17 Santos Silva and Tenreyro propose a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model to deal with 
heteroskedasticity in constant-elasticity models, such as log-linear gravity models. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, they show that that the PPML produces estimates with the lowest bias for different patterns of 
heteroskedasticity.  However, Martin and Pham (2008) point out that the data-generating process used by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro did not produce zero-values properly. When correcting the data-generating 
process to obtain a sample with zero-value observations, Martin and Pham find that the ET-Tobit estimates 
have a lower bias than those obtained with the PPML estimator.     30
Table 5 
Robustness Checks of Different Estimation Methods. 
 
    1a  1b 2 3 4 5 6 
Estimation method  Two-stage HMR procedure OLS  OLS  Tobit  ET-tobit  PPML 
Dependent variable  ln(X)  ln(x)  ln(1+x) ln(1+x)  ln(a+X)  (X) 
Distance (log)  -1.121 -0.439 -1.125 -1.144 -1.153 -1.102 -0.625
   [0.024]*** [0.062]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.026]*** [0.024]*** [0.040]***
GDP Importer (log)  0.883 0.253 0.886 0.906 0.913 0.87 0.595
   [0.027]*** [0.049]*** [0.027]*** [0.028]*** [0.027]*** [0.025]*** [0.073]***
GDP Exporter (log)  0.816 0.228 0.819 0.842 0.849 0.803 0.427
   [0.029]*** [0.046]*** [0.029]*** [0.030]*** [0.028]*** [0.025]*** [0.057]***
Population Importer (log)  0.122 0.034 0.122 0.125 0.126 0.124 0.188
   [0.023]*** [0.037]  [0.023]*** [0.024]*** [0.023]*** [0.021]*** [0.048]***
Population Exporter (log)  0.261 0.016 0.261 0.255 0.255 0.254 0.351
   [0.024]*** [0.037]  [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.023]*** [0.021]*** [0.054]***
Landlocked Importer  -0.049 0.104 -0.047 -0.018 -0.019 -0.026 -0.075
   [0.056] [0.091] [0.056]  [0.056] [0.057]  [0.052] [0.131] 
Landlocked Exporter  -0.202 -0.093 -0.204 -0.224 -0.232 -0.205 -0.176
  [0.057]*** [0.091]  [0.058]*** [0.058]*** [0.055]*** [0.050]*** [0.098]* 
Common border  1.256 0.376 1.255 1.262 1.258 1.27 0.85
   [0.142]*** [0.448]  [0.142]*** [0.145]*** [0.137]*** [0.124]*** [0.178]***
Common language  1.319 0.865 1.328 1.411 1.429 1.332 -0.039
   [0.074]*** [0.250]*** [0.074]*** [0.074]*** [0.075]*** [0.068]*** [0.142] 
TTRI  -1.319 -0.302 -1.331 -1.407 -1.437 -1.297 -2.944
   [0.368]*** [0.148]**  [0.372]*** [0.393]*** [0.185]*** [0.167]*** [0.960]***
NTB-RI  0.993 -0.932 0.977 0.615 0.588 0.582 0.167
  [0.312]*** [0.411]**  [0.312]*** [0.325]* [0.305]*  [0.275]**  [0.812] 
LPI Importer  0.367 0.298 0.369 0.386 0.392 0.375 0.311
   [0.071]*** [0.145]**  [0.071]*** [0.073]*** [0.073]*** [0.066]*** [0.151]**
LPI Exporter  1.177 0.882 1.179 1.206 1.21 1.178 0.52
   [0.073]*** [0.158]*** [0.073]*** [0.074]*** [0.071]*** [0.065]*** [0.142]***
DB Import Costs (log)  -0.271 -0.213 -0.274 -0.302 -0.307 -0.282 -0.507
   [0.050]*** [0.091]**  [0.050]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.046]*** [0.111]***
DB Export Costs (log)  -0.367 -0.207 -0.373 -0.416 -0.43 -0.369 -0.432
  [0.051]*** [0.090]**  [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.048]*** [0.044]*** [0.105]***
Entry cost indicator     -0.198               
      [0.086]**                
Constant  -29.803 -6.253 -29.901 -30.459 -30.656 -29.163 -13.548
   [0.697]*** [1.331]*** [0.698]*** [0.706]*** [0.722]*** [0.656]*** [1.485]***
Observations  10508 10508 10278 10508 10508 10508  10508
R-squared        0.74  0.74          
Note: Robust standard errors are in brackets.  
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
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Ad-valorem Equivalent Estimates 
 
As the gravity model contains TTRI, a measure of tariff restrictiveness in ad-valorem 
terms, the coefficient estimates are used to compute counterfactual ad-valorem TTRI 
variations that would otherwise be generated by a variation in Doing Business trade cost 
figures for a given country.
18 To illustrate how these counterfactuals are constructed, 
suppose that regulatory reform or investment in an exporter country leads to a 1 percent 
reduction in reported Doing Business export costs. This leads to a change in trade flows 
of about   Cost Export DB _ _ ˆ    percent according to gravity estimates.
19 The same change in 
trade flows would be brought about if importers cut the tariffs applied to imports from 
this country by an equivalent value of the TTRI equal to  TTRIt Cost Export DB   ˆ / ˆ
_ _ .
20 
Therefore, the latter figure roughly represents the “tariff-cut equivalent” or “ad-valorem 
equivalent” of a 1 percent change in the cost of export procedures inferred from gravity 
model estimates. 
 
We use estimated coefficients of the outcome equation in specification 1 (Table 4) to 
compute the “ad-valorem equivalent” reduction in the costs of both export and import 
procedures for each African country in the sample halfway to the level of Mauritius, the 
country with the lowest costs along these measures.
21 Figure 8 reports these estimates as 
well as the average value of TTRI faced abroad by each African exporter weighted by its 
export share. Although the latter figure is rough and dependent on the composition of 
exports across destinations, it provides a helpful summary of tariff restrictiveness faced 
across destinations by each African exporter.  
 
For most countries, the ad-valorem equivalent of the change in export costs is larger than 
the change in import costs.  This is a consequence of the estimates of the elasticity of 
export and import costs with respect to trade flows,
22 even if the table in the Appendix 
shows that the cost of importing a standardized container of goods is larger than the cost 
of exporting a similar one for countries other than Mauritius. As illustrated in Figure 8, 
for most of the countries, the cut in export costs is more important than completely 
canceling the tariff barriers they face, as measured by the TTRI of importers. 
 
                                                 
18 For simplicity, TTRI is expressed as a percentage, meaning that a figure of 5 percent is equal to 0.05 in 
decimals. 
19 For notation purposes, let  X  ˆ  be the estimated elasticity of imports with respect to the variable X 
entering in the gravity equation. In the case of Doing Business export costs, the estimates should be 
negative. 
20 We use the TTRI estimated coefficient in specification 1 in Table 4, instead of the OTRI coefficient in 
specification 2. Indeed, the former being greater in magnitude, it leads to smaller or more conservative 
estimates of ad-valorem equivalent figures than those constructed using the OTRI. 
21 The Appendix contains a table with the values for the Doing Business costs of export and import 
procedures for the African countries considered in the gravity estimates. 
22  Cost Export DB _ _ ˆ   being larger than  Cost port DB _ Im _ ˆ   in absolute value, a 1 percent cut in export costs 
would increase exports more than imports induced by a 1 percent cut in import costs.     32
 
Figure 8 
Average TTRI and Estimated “Ad-valorem Equivalents” of an Improvement in LPI  
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Consider the case of Ethiopia if its logistic environment were to improve so that the 
import costs measured by Doing Business were cut halfway to the level of Mauritius.  
The equivalent change in imports would be brought about by a reduction in Ethiopian 
tariffs of about 7.8 percent, assuming the composition of import volumes across partners 
does not change.
23  Similarly, if costs of exporting the standardized container in Ethiopia 
were cut halfway to the level of Mauritius, the change in exports would be equivalent to 
the one triggered by an average cut in the TTRI it faces of about 7.65 percent.  This 
figure is substantial for Ethiopia as it faces an average TTRI of 1.85 percent. 
 
It is also worth noting that such an exercise produces illustrative estimates. The standard 
caveats for gravity estimates hold, such as the appropriateness of the constant elasticity 
functional form, the dependence of the value of estimates on the choice of independent 
variables, and so on. However, constant elasticity gravity models are standard in the 
literature, and the estimated coefficients used to compute the “ad-valorem equivalents” 
seem stable across specifications and a specification leading to “conservative” estimates 
is retained.  
 
 
                                                 
23 For simplicity, we do not take into consideration estimates on the selection equation to compute the ad-
valorem equivalent estimates. Indeed, the indirect effect of trade costs on trade volumes through trade 
propensity is negligible as the estimated coefficient of the inverse-Mills ratio is small in the outcome 
equation.   33
5. Conclusion: Looking Ahead 
 
High trade costs prevent the full realization of the gains from expanding global trade 
opportunities.  This is particularly true in regard to Africa, which has some of the highest 
trade transactions costs among all developing countries.  Action to lower trade costs and 
facilitate trade is critically important today.  World trade is projected to decline in 2009 
for the first time since 1982.  Steps to reform regulatory barriers to trade that raise trade 
costs, such as those outlined in this paper, can help facilitate exports and imports at a time 
of significant stress in the international economic environment. The agenda over the short 
and long term to stabilize the world economy and support trade growth is especially 
important to Africa. As reviewed here, both regulatory barriers and costs of inadequate 
infrastructure raise trade costs in the region. The aid-for-trade agenda, collective global 
programs to support the poor during the crisis, and trade policy talks can productively 
address trade facilitation as part of the new approaches to mitigate the crisis.    
 
This paper outlines important links between trade costs and poverty that are ever more 
important today.  Farmers that are able to better support high-yield export crops are on 
average less poor than farmers more oriented toward subsistence activities, as shown by 
Porto (2008). High trade costs in Africa prevent farmers from moving into production of 
major export crops. Policies to reduce trade costs and encourage marketing activities in 
rural areas can be useful to facilitate exports and reduce poverty. Examples include 
expanding roads, access to marketing information, and measures that promote the 
development of market arrangements as Porto has shown.  
 
The empirical research reviewed here suggests that important gains can be achieved in 
Africa through trade facilitation reform. Estimates in this paper suggest that 
improvements in trade logistics to cut trade costs for the less advanced African countries 
to a level comparable to more advanced countries in the region could be more important 
in terms of trade expansion than a reduction in tariffs.  New analysis, for example, 
indicates that increasing South Africa’s capacity in trade facilitation half-way to the high-
income country average would increase trade by an amount equivalent to the effect of 
South Africa’s trading partners decreasing their tariffs on imports by 18.94 percent 
(Wilson, Portugal-Perez, and Taylor, 2009). In sum, unilateral action and domestic 
reform matter for Africa. 
 
It is also important, however, to place the discussion of trade costs in the context of 
multilateral trade negotiations. Successful completion of the Doha Round of the WTO 
that achieves cuts in agricultural barriers, for example, would benefit Africa. The Doha 
Agenda also includes talk on a trade facilitation agreement that would increase the 
transparency of trade rules with a goal of lowering trade costs. Success in this agreement 
is also important in regard to Africa’s domestic and international agenda to expand trade 
opportunities. 
 
Despite the unfavorable factors reviewed here, there are potential good prospects for 
growth in Africa over the long term. Apart from the oil producing nations, some countries 
have been experiencing strong growth, in part with global price increases in primary 
export commodities. This worldwide increase in commodity prices has been engendered 
in large part by the rapid growth of developing countries in Asia, especially China and   34
India, before the financial crises. Their demand for these commodities is likely to recover 
when the world economy moves beyond recession. A number of countries in Africa are 
diversifying their exports. The region no longer relies solely on exports of a few raw 
commodities. Exports are increasingly composed of light manufactured goods, processed 
foods, and services such as tourism and call centers. Some countries—such as Nigeria 
and South Africa—have been increasing their shares of exports in technology-based 
products, as noted by Broadman (2007). Lowering trade costs to take advantage of future 
opportunities is part of the context in which African trade and development prospects can 
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Source:  World Bank Doing Business (2008). 
Country 
Cost of export 
procedures 
(USD) 
Cost of import 
procedures 
(USD) 
Angola  1850 2325 
Burkina Faso  2096 3522 
Cameroon  907 1529 
Chad  4867 5520 
Côte d'Ivoire  1653 2457 
Ethiopia  1617 2793 
Gabon  1510 1600 
Ghana  895 895 
Kenya  1955 1995 
Madagascar  1182 1282 
Malawi  1623 2500 
Mali  1752 2680 
Mauritius  728 673 
Mozambique  1155 1185 
Nigeria  1026 1550 
Senegal  828 1047 
South Africa  1087 1720 
Sudan  1700 1195 
Tanzania  1212 2300 
Uganda  2940 894 
Zambia  2098 2840 
Zimbabwe  1879 2420 